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## **Mayor's party alignment and public policy execution: evidence from Brazil**

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### **1. Introduction**

In Brazil the government delivers 40 million meals a day to students at public schools at the total amount of over 760 million euros in 2021 (Conselho de Monitoramento e Avaliação de Políticas Públicas, 2020). The procurement of these meals is directly linked to smallholders sells as part (30%) of the school feeding budget must be used to buy from them. Even though it is a country wide public policy, there are many differences on how local governments in municipalities execute it, the percentage they buy from smallholders varies from zero to almost one hundred per cent.

FAO acknowledges this Brazilian public policy, the national school feeding program (PNAE in Portuguese) as a pioneer and well succeeded case. It is rare for a school feeding program to reach every student in public schools not only minorities. For every dollar spent on this program, there's nine dollars return (FAO, 2021). However, as the 30% set aside rule is not hardly enforced, it leaves space for political use. The mayors have some autonomy to create incentives or not for this public policy to happen.

Considering this context, we investigate the following research question: Does having a mayor of the same party that created this public policy at the federal level makes it more likely to achieve the law target of procuring from smallholders?

Previous research has investigated challenges and innovative manners of managing intergovernmental relations (Jaccoud, 2019). Responsibility allocation and autonomy are important features of this relation. We advance on investigating if political alignment based on policy seeking party theory is also an important feature for this relation and public policy implementation.

This research question is empirically relevant for some reasons. The first reason is related to a social impact. "Family farmer<sup>i</sup> agriculture is fundamental for Brazilian development. There approximately 4.4 million family farmers, which is 84% of all Brazilian farmers" (Brazilian Agriculture Ministry, 2018). And the analyzed law incentives public procurement specifically from this agriculture type.

The second reason is that this policy has a national and comprehensive reach. In 2016, 5,570 municipalities and 154,060 schools participated on the analyzed program, which generated R\$ 3,421,487,528.00 in food procurement. This has clearly a relevance for the welfare as it is related to education, health and a large economic budget with respect to children, teachers and family farmer producers.

Our main contribution relies on the kind of data we use as we collected information for all 5,570 municipalities in Brazil. As we use population data, we are confident we have a representative sample. We possibly contribute to the public management by showing if party alignment can influence a public policy implementation.

The paper is organized as follow. Section two presents the theoretical framework, institutional context of school feeding program and politics in Brazil. On section three we describe the data we used. Section four shows the methodology, and we explain the variables. Section five presents our results. The conclusion on section six contains policy implications as well as research suggestions.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

As PNAE is public procurement mechanism, it works as market, with the implication it has demand and a supply side. The supply side actors are the family farmers, who produce food to be sold to the government. The demand actors are the public agents who have some autonomy decide how to procure foodstuff to be distributed in schools.

Our argument is that even though PNAE is nationwide public policy, there are institutions that can hinder or encourage its implementation, and these institutions are influenced by the color of the party in power. Based on the idea of policy-seeking party (Strom, 1990), parties search for power to create and implement public policies. PNAE 30% procurement rule was created by PT (initials for workers party in Portuguese). Therefore, we expect that mayors from PT party and its coalitions would be aligned with this public policy and more willing to implement it.

### **a. Institutional Setting**

Brazil is a federal State with three government layers: the federal level, the state level (26 states plus a Federal District) and the municipal level (5,570 municipalities). According to the Brazilian Constitution, each level of government is responsible for certain public educational provision (Brazil, 1988). In the rest of the paper, the focus of our analysis will be on elementary school at the municipal level.

The federal level collects most of the taxes in the country and redistribute part of these financial resources to the lower levels to help them provide public services (Arretche, 2002). For most municipalities, there is a strong dependence on federal transfers because a large part of the state and municipal budget comes from these federal transfers. For 81.98% of Brazilian municipalities, transfers from federal and state levels accounted for more than 75% of total municipal budget in 2016. This dependency ratio was less than 50% in only 1.81% of them (Ministério da Economia, 2017).

One of the policies dedicated to the public educational sector is known as the national school feeding program (PNAE in Portuguese). Since 2009, this program requires that, at least 30% of the resources passed on by the federal government for school feeding to the municipalities and states public schools should be used to procure foodstuffs from family agriculture (federal law number n° 11,947)<sup>ii</sup>.

The federal entity who manages PNAE and transfers money to lower administrative levels is the National Education Development Fund (FNDE in Portuguese) a structure part of the Ministry of Education. The amount of money transferred from FNDE to municipalities is based on the number of students enrolled in the previous year. It is a fixed amount per student in the whole country<sup>iii</sup>. Another fundamental actor for PNAE is called “executing entity”. It is responsible for the overall operation of the program at the local level, and this includes receiving the funds, creating the menu, publishing procurement calls, signing contracts, delivering daily meals and nutritional education. States, municipalities and even individual primary schools can play the role of executing entity. Municipalities are traditionally the executing entity for secondary and elementary schools and pre-kindergarten.

The last fundamental actor for PNAE is known as School Feeding Councils (CAE in Portuguese). These councils are responsible for monitoring school feeding programs at the state and municipal levels. Besides ensuring wise use of financial resources, CAEs encourage the efficient delivery of the program (Kelly and Swensson, 2017). It is a collegial body serving as a forum for decision

making and advisory nature, it makes recommendations for the actors who is implementing the program. It is made of at least 7 full members: one political representative (the mayor or its secretaries), two members representing education workers and students, two members representing civil society and two members representing parents. Every year, all municipalities and states submit their food procurement invoices to be approved by the SFC, thus allowing municipalities and states to send these documents to federal government. SFC has the power to disapprove the accounts the municipality provide, thus making them redo it before sending to FNDE or even hindering this process which can lead to the municipality not receiving the funds on the next term.

FNDE is authorized to suspend transfers of PNAE to executing units if they fail to constitute the respective SFC or fail to present the book accounts of the resources previously received for the execution of the PNAE or to commit irregularities in the execution of the PNAE. Note however that the failure to reach the 30% target goal is not a requirement for the executing entities to keep receiving money from the federal government<sup>iv</sup>. There are some justifications that municipalities may claim for non-compliance with the law, they are especially related to the low or uncertain supply of the family farmer's products (Bonduki, 2017).

### **b. Political context**

Since 1990, coordination mechanisms have required municipalities to be more responsible for public policies implementation. However, this responsibility has not come with more autonomy for the municipalities and in the following decades (Arretche, 2004). Federal government mobilized strategies and coordination mechanisms to change intergovernmental relations in favor of a more cooperative pattern, favoring the institution of common objectives and plans, national standards, and access guarantees, and producing a reduction in inequalities in offers and even in results (Jaccoud, 2019). PNAE's 30% rule is part of this strategy as it is a federal public policy implemented by other governmental spheres and searches for inequalities reduction favoring a marginalized population, smallholders farmers.

The origin, expansion and consolidation of a system of public policies in Brazil stemmed from the process of reorganization of civil society, with the redemocratization in the mid-1980s. The end of more than two decades of military dictatorship (1964- 1985), occurred with the expansion of society's discontent (for instance, high inflation) and the intensification of the movements making pressure for the democratic reopening, where "direct now" (Diretas Já in Portuguese) stands out (Castro & Ribeiro, 2009).

In 1980, the Workers' Party (PT initials in Portuguese) emerged, founded by groups opposing the dictatorial regime, such as union movements from the ABC region that concentrated the Brazilian automobile industry, intellectuals, artists and Catholics linked to Liberation Theology. PT demanded more jobs, housing, education, health, agrarian reform, an end to hunger and other social advances. An agenda that made it one of the most important political parties in Brazil (Hunter, 2010).

The 1988 Constitution, created right after the dictatorial regime, which had an important participation of society, formed the basis for expanding the population's access to public goods and services. In this context, education and health were recognized as a priority and received special treatment with increased resources aimed at universal access to Elementary Education. The reconfiguration of the national system of social policies towards a redistributive model of social protection was inspired by the logic of the welfare policy of post-war European countries (Arretche & Marques, 2020).

PT, upon assuming the presidency in 2003, received the legacy of the policies built after the end of the dictatorship, with the intensification of interventions to reduce social inequalities, making fight against hunger and poverty a priority through a series of public policies. PNAE 30% rule is an example of this. PT party was especially concerned with a more centralized and equal implementation of public policies when it was in power for the federal government from 2003 to 2015. PNAE's 30% rule was a federal law demanded by the president (Lula at the time) and it was then approved by the congress houses (Schottz and Schmitt, 2021).

Even though it is hard to localize Brazilian parties between the right and left spectrum as it is a fragment multi-party system, regarding its government plans for president running, Schottz and Schmitt (2021) found it to always be in the left, differently from PSDB, another important party that have been running the presidential elections since 1989, and have shifted side in some years. PT has been a relevant party in Brazilian political system not only for its presence in the federal government but also for its presence with the representatives in the municipalities.

### 3. Data Description

Our database is composed by population and not sample data information for all the 5,570 municipalities, that was our analysis level, each observation relates to a municipality. This makes us confident we are using a representative sample as it covers all Brazilian municipalities. Even though the data we use is free and easily accessible on the internet, we are not aware of any previous researchers that created and analyzed a database merging different kind of data as we did in a countrywide manner.

The data we rely on come from various sources. The dependent variable is from National Education Development Fund (FNDE in Portuguese). Every year all municipalities and states are required to provide information and documents to confirm on how they used the money transferred from FNDE to procure school food. If they provide incorrect or false information they can be sued for public authorities. For this reason, it is an official and reliable data.

Data from the elected mayor's party coalition come from Superior Electoral Court (TSE in Portuguese). All candidates to electoral positions in Brazil must report information to this court, and this is one of them.

The third source of data is the Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute (IBGE in Portuguese). Specifically, their database called Basic Municipal Information Survey Munic 2014's edition (Pesquisa de Informações Básicas Municipais), a census run every year in all 5,570 Brazilian municipalities. The question that where relevant for this research are on governance and education management information (specifically data on the variables number of SFC meetings, SFC parity, SFC year of creation, access information law, education budget responsibility under education organ and HR in education over population).

### 4. Methodology

To investigate our research question, we use ordinary use cross section least square regression. Our main specification for the empirical model is the following:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PT_{mayor} + \beta_2 controls + \varepsilon_i$$

Where:  $y_i$  is the percentage of smallholder's farmers product procurement over total food product procurement for a municipality in 2017 i,  $PT_{mayor}$  is a dummy variable for party alignment,

which takes 1 if the mayor is part of a PT coalition, controls are variables that can be related to the amount and  $\varepsilon_i$  is as the error term.

#### **a. Dependent variable**

Our dependent variable relies on the proportion of the school feeding budget used to procure products from family farmers over total budget of school feeding. This information is available annually in the FNDE database from 2011 to 2017. Specifically, we use the year 2017 as the mayors elected in 2016 start their mandate in 2017.

We also used the average of the years 2015 to 2017 proportion of family farmer's products bought by a given municipality as dependent variable in our model. We do so to control for potential harvest variations on the period. Harvests vary from a year to another, especially for family farmers who usually do not have the technology to mitigate climate hazards such as fertilizers.

#### **b. Independent variable**

Our independent variable of most interest is the mayor's party coalition. It is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the elected mayor in a municipality was a candidate from PT (worker's party) or from a party coalition that includes PT. We believe this is relevant variable for the success of PNAE program because there can be some contexts that allow the municipalities to get closer to reaching the law target. And the mayor's political alignment with the party that created this public policy would be one of these contexts.

#### **c. Control variables**

We control for variables that can be related to procuring from family farmers but not to electing a candidate from PT party as a mayor. Some of these variables are part of school feeding governance. The first is the number of School Feeding Council meetings in the last 12 months, we use it as proxy for how active SFC is. We expect this variable to have a positive association with more family farm procurement as a more participative group of stakeholders would be more organized to pressure the authorities on applying PNAE law. The second is school feeding parity. This is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is at least one representative for each stakeholder recommended by a federal law in SFC and zero otherwise. We expected this variable to have a positive association with more family farm procurement as a more diverse group of stakeholders could represent different actors such as students and family farmers, and they would be more concerned with this issue and willing to pressure the authorities on applying the 30% minimum law.

The third governance related variable is the year of creation of school feeding council, we expect that the older the better for procuring more from family farmers. As an older SFC would be more institutionalized and able to pressure for reaching the law's target. The last governance variable is if there is information access law in the municipality, it is a dummy variable. We expected this variable to have a positive association with more family farm procurement as citizens who can be better informed of how public management happens in their municipality would be more able to make pressure on it.

The other set of control variables is related to education management. There are two dummies related to each other: education budget under education organ responsibility, like education secretary and education budget under mayor responsibility. It was originally a categorical variable whose possibilities were mayor, education organ and other. If education budget is under education organ responsibility, it probably means it is not treated in a general way as it would be if under

mayor or others responsibility. We expect it to have a positive impact on more procurement from family farmers. If education budget is under mayor’s responsibility, it can be more accessible to corruption activities. We expect it to have a negative impact on more procurement from family farmers.

Education management third variable is the proportion of human resources in education management by population, as with more human resources, it could be easier to implement public policies. In this variable, we divide the number of civil servants who are not teachers by the population. We expect it to have a positive impact on more procurement from family farmers.

Improvement of school feeding is a yes or no question posed in 2014 in Basic Municipal Information Survey- “Munic” database. It asked if there was an improvement that year. We consider it to be a proxy for political motivation towards public schools, a positive factor for more family farm procurement according to Souza-Esquerdo et al (2014), Lopes et al (2019).

**Table 1: Variables description**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Expected relation with dependent variable</b>
<b>Dependent variable</b>		
Family farmer's products procurement percentage 2017	How much of the school feeding budget was used to procure family farmers products in 2017	
Family farmer's products procurement percentage (average from 2015 to 2017)	How much of the school feeding budget was used to procure family farmers products in average from 2015 to 2017	
<b>Independent variable</b>		
PTparty	Takes the value of 1 if the elected mayor in the municipality is the PT party candidate or PT is in her party coalition and 0 otherwise	Positive
<b>Controls</b>		
Number of SFC meetings	How many meetings did SFC take last years?	Positive
SFC parity	Does SFC follow representatives proportion	Positive
SFC year of creation	When SFC was created	Negative
Access information law	If there is a municipality law that helps citizens and press to access public management information	Positive


Education budget responsibility under education organ	Education budget is under educational organ responsibility	positive
HR/population	Proportion of civil servants on population	Positive
Improvement of school feeding	The municipality adopts targeted actions regarding improvement of school feeding	Positive

Source: research data

**5. Results and discussion**  
**a. Descriptive analysis**

Figure 1 below depicts how smallholder’s products procurement is distributed through municipalities. The first striking result is the fact that more than 600 municipalities (around 10% of the number of municipalities) bought almost no food from family farmers. This is surprising because from the time of collection of our data, the law on school food procurement was already 5 years old. Most municipalities buy between 20% and 40% of food products coming from family farmers. Nevertheless, few municipalities were procuring almost 100% of their school feeding products from smallholders. 3,110 municipalities procure less than 30% from family farmers, which means they do not accomplish the law minimum goal and other 2,460 meet the requested target.

**Figure 1: Repartition of the share of family farms products in municipal food procurement**



Source: research data

Because of its geographical size, Brazil is a very heterogeneous country. Cultural and geographical factors differ much across the country, and this may affect our dependent variable in many ways. For instance, North is the largest region in geographic area, and it has the lowest number of municipalities, which means that municipalities are larger there and smallholders may have to deal with longer distances to deliver their products and higher costs. Due to Amazon Forest location,



part of its land is protected by law and cannot be used for agriculture production. Northeast region has the second largest percentage of family farms establishments over total agriculture establishments and the largest percentage of family farm's production over total production. Despite the supply availability, the proportion of family farms 'products in school food procurement remains relatively low.

Southeast region in 2016 had the worst family farm products procurement percentage mean, around 18% (IPEA, 2019) despite the highest percentage of family farms establishments. South is the only region whose family farm products procurement percentage mean in 2016 was greater than 30% (IPEA, 2019). Midwest is known by its large conventional agriculture livestock farms and has the lowest percentage of family farms establishments, these two facts are possibly correlated.

**Table 2: Characteristics by Region**

Region name	North	Northeast	Southeast	South	Midwest
Number of states	7	9	4	3	4
Number of municipalities	450	1794	1668	1191	467
% of family farm procured for public schools (average from year 2015 to 2017)	19.61%	22.08%	26.88%	42.37%	18.84%
Family farm establishments percentage mean	0.8236279	0.8623924	0.6991865	0.8276682	0.6407217
Family farm production mean (in value terms of money)	0.7331928	0.8115728	0.4776979	0.5787455	0.306938

Source: research data

In table 3 we show some descriptive statistics for the whole sample of municipalities. Even seven years after the implementation of the law on school food procurement, the mean of the family farm products procured was still below the legal target in 2017. The simple average of family farmer's products procurement percentage for the last 3 available years is lower than only for 2017, which means the last year was probably higher than the previous ones.

The number of SFC meetings in around six, which means they meet every two months. More than 90% of SFC follow the stakeholder composition required by law. The mean year of SFC creation is 2001, three years after its creation was required by law but eight years before the 30% rule creation. Less than 20% of the municipalities presents an access information law, which is not required by a federal rule and may indicate that it is hard for citizens to get informed about how public policies are implemented.

A little more than 30% of the municipalities elected a PT mayor in 2016. This weak PT party performance was possibly influenced by the impeachment the president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, who was from PT suffered a few months before the mayor's election.

Education budget is under the responsibility of an education organ for almost half of the sample. We consider this to be the most appropriate manner, as it is probably this specific management option. For other 34% of the sample, education budget is under the responsibility of the mayor's office and for around 17% of the sample, education budget is under some other government agency's responsibility. The average for the proportion of human resources in education by population is 0.02, which means there are 49 people for each municipality level civil servant in education. In the maximum, there are 10 people for each civil servant. Finally, more than 94% of the survey respondents said there was some school improvement in the previous 12 months,

**Table 3: Descriptive Statistics whole sample**

Variable	Type	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<b>Dependent variable</b>						
Family farmer's products procurement percentage 2017	Percentage	5,160	28.95689	20.98381	0	99.704
Family farmer's products procurement percentage (average from 2015 to 2017)	Percentage	5,160	27.77605	17.8721	0	99.749
<b>Independent variable</b>						
PT party	Dummy	5,113	0.3078428	0.4616463	0	1
<b>Controls</b>						
Number of SFC meetings	Continuous and positive values only	5,009	6.717908	4.893564	0	120
SFC parity	Dummy	5,045	0.9066402	0.2909648	0	1
SFC year of creation	Continuous and positive values only	4,977	2001.805	5.541838	1947	2014
Access information law	Dummy	5,160	0.196124	0.3971019	0	1
Education budget responsibility under education organ	Dummy	5,160	0.4926357	0.4999942	0	1
Education budget under mayor's responsibility	Dummy	5,160	0.3472868	0.476154	0	1
HR/population	Continuous and positive values only	5,131	0.0203785	0.0096547	0	0.0936

Improvement of school feeding	Dummy	5,144	0.9459565	0.2261256	0	1
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Source: research data

Table 4 compares the subsample of municipalities complying with the law (30% of food procured coming from family farms) with the subsample that does not for the dependent variable of most interest. We see the mean of PT party elected mayor is lower for the municipalities that do not accomplish the law target and it is statistically different from the subsample that accomplishes the law according to T-test. In the last column, there is the difference between the mean of the sample not complying with the law minus the one that does it, that is why it is a negative result.

**Table 4: Descriptive Statistics comparing non-complying and complying subsamples**

“Not complying” 2017 sample					“Complying” 2017 sample				
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Dev.	diff = mean(NC) - mean(C)
PT_party	2590	0.295	0.009	0.4561	2523	0.321	0.0093	0.467	-1.7606*

Source: research data

### b. Regressions analysis

In this section, we present results from our empirical strategy. In the estimation use the average of the family farm procurement as the dependent variable. PT party elected mayor was significant at 1% confidence interval with a positive signal as predicted.

The number of School Feeding Council meeting was significant but with negative signal, which is unexpected. Possibly because if there are too many meetings, it might suggest that the procurement process is too bureaucratic detail-oriented and it may harm smallholders’ farmers. SFC parity was significant at 10% with a negative signal, which is unexpected and requires further investigation. SFC year of creation had a signal opposite from what we expected but it was not significant.

Access information law was significant at 1% and positive possibly because it a proxy for more transparency in public management. There are more family farmers products procurement percentage when education budget is under education organ responsibility than when it is under mayor’s responsibility. HR/population negatively impacts family farm products percentage possibly for the same reason more SFC meetings do too. Finally, improvement of school feeding does not impact family farm products percentage possibly because it is not specific to this feature of PNAE.

The only variables with more than 50% correlation between each other are education budget under education organ responsibility and education budget under mayor’s responsibility. They were created from the same 3 options question on the survey. R squared is 4,7% which is suitable considering we are not using many variables

**Table 5: Regressions using family farm products percentage as dependent variable**

Dependent variable: perc_pnae_2017 as continuous
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PT party elected mayor	1.548** (0.641)
Controls	
Number of SFC meetings	-0.136** (0.0603)
SFC parity	-1.702* (1.022)
SFC year of creation	0.0692 (0.0533)
Access information law	6.155*** (0.745)
Education budget under education organ responsibility	2.740*** (0.855)
Education budget under mayor's responsibility	-1.832** (0.901)
HR/population	-259.6*** (31.40)
Improvement of school feeding	1.862 (1.320)
Constant	-105.7 (106.8)
Observations	4,873
R-squared	0.047

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: research data

As robustness check, we regressed the dependent variable as dummy that takes the value of 1 if the school feeding budget spent on family farmers products is at least 30% and zero otherwise. In this dependent variable alternative manner, PT party elected mayor variable remains significant at 1% confidence interval. The number of SFC meetings and education budget under mayor's responsibility are less important in this model, as they are significant only at a greater confidence interval. SFC parity is not significant at this model while improvement of school feeding becomes significant.

**Table 6: Regressions using family farm products percentage as dummy**

Dependent variable: perc_pnae_2017 as dummy	
PT party elected mayor	0.0333** (0.0153)
Number of SFC meetings	-0.00242* (0.00144)
SFC parity	-0.0241 (0.0244)
SFC year of creation	0.00149 (0.00127)
Access information law	0.110*** (0.0178)
Education budget under education organ responsibility	0.0570*** (0.0204)
Education budget under mayor's responsibility	-0.0370* (0.0215)
HR/population	-4.935*** (0.750)
Improvement of school feeding	0.0709** (0.0315)
Constant	-2.467 (2.551)
Observations	4,873
R-squared	0.031

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: research data

## 6. Conclusion

Our analysis illuminates that the implementation of smallholder's products procurement in Brazilian school feeding program contingent on the color of the party in power in the municipalities. We did so based on the policy-seeking party idea and the recent political Brazilian context. We used countrywide quantitative data and ran ordinary least square regression using control variables.

This research contribution relies mostly on the kind of data we use. We choose to use a broad and not so specific data collect in each of all 5,570 municipalities in Brazil. A practical recommendation for the greater success for PNAE 30% rule implementation is more transparency in public management at the municipality level. Having an access information law impacts the percentage bought from family farmers product to school feeding.

A limitation for this research is that we do not know if having a PT party mayor impact is due to the identification with being part of the party that created PNAE 30% or identification just with the fact it is an inequality reduction policy independent of what party created it. Another limitation is we do not account how important PT is the coalition of the elected mayor, just if it was part of it or not.

For future research we recommend using data for the previous mayor election in 2012 to check if the impact of having a mayor from PT was relevant for PNAE 30% rule implementation in that time also. This data could be used for investigating the impact of changing the color party of the mayor on the public policy.

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<sup>i</sup>According to the Brazilian law (n° 11,326), a farmer is considered a family farmer if he or she: does not hold, in any way, an area greater than 4 (four) fiscal modules (that depending on the municipality a fiscal module varies from 50,000 to 1,100,000 square meters) predominantly use the labor force of the family itself in the economic activities of its establishment or enterprise; have income predominantly originated from activities linked to the farm; direct his or hers establishment or enterprise with his or hers family.

<sup>ii</sup> This law only apply to public school as private schools do not receive public money for school feeding.

<sup>iii</sup> With exceptions to minorities who are ‘quilombolas’, those of African descent, and indigenous communities. These minorities receive more money than traditional students.

<sup>iv</sup> In May 2020, FNDE released the normative number 6 that says “*The percentage not executed in accordance with the provision in the caput will be assessed when rendering accounts and the corresponding amount must be returned.*” This may be a fundamental difference on enforcement, as until before this resolution, returning money to FNDE was not foreseen by law. FNDE is already giving support to the executing units on how this will be implemented. Our data however cover a period below this change in the enforcement of the school program.